The Changing Relationship of the Judicial and Executive Branches by Aumann, F. R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 5
1934
The Changing Relationship of the Judicial and
Executive Branches
F. R. Aumann
The Ohio State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aumann, F. R. (1934) "The Changing Relationship of the Judicial and Executive Branches," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 22 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol22/iss2/5
THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP OF THE JUDICIAL
AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES.
By F. R. Aul TxN*
The principle of the separation of powers assumes :' three
departments of government ;2 the division of governmental pow-
ers among these departments in such a manner that each de-
partment will serve as a check upon the other ;3 the existence of
certain functions that are particularly "legislative," "execu-
tive," or "judicial.'' 1
The thxeory of three independent departments, each exer-
cising some power over the other and guarding against en-
croachments was never in complete agreement with the facts.
The theory the legislative function involves the establishment of
rules of conduct for all persons and authorities within the state;
the judicial function involves the deciding of present controver-
sies in accordance with such rules; and the executive function
involves the enforcing of such rules as are laid down by the
legislature, and the judgment of the courts.2 In actual fact, the
activities of government are a unit.3 Cooperation between the
departments is a prime necessity if the work of government is
to succeed. 4 If the theory of the separation of powers had been
strictly applied successful governmental activity would be
greatly hindered.5
*Francis R. Aumann, A. B. 1921, Ohio Wesleyan University; A. M.
1925, Ohio State University; Ph. D. 1928, University of Iowa; Instruc-
tor in Political Science, Ohio State University; contributor to various
legal and social science periodicals.
I Frank A. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law (1893), pp.
19-30; Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1928), pp. 58-77.
Frederick Green, "Separation of Powers," Yale Law J. Vol. 19,
p. 371.
'Frank A. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law (1893),
pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.
4 "While it is true," says a judge of the supreme court of North
Carolina, that "the executive, the legislative, and the supreme judicial
powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct, it
is also true that the science of government is a practical one; there-
fore, while each should firmly maintain the essential powers belong-
ing to it, it cannot be forgotten that the three coordinate parts consti-
tute one brotherhood whose common trust requires a mutual tolera-
tion of the occupancy of what seems to be 'a common because of
vicinage' bordering on the domains of each." Frank A. Goodnow,
Comparative Administrative Law, p. 21.
rR. Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, p. 105.
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Despite this fact, it must be recognized that the theory of
the separation of powers, as enumerated by Montesquieu has had
an immense effect upon the structure of our political system.
6
It lies at the very basis of our political organization today.
7
In recent times, however, the exceptions to this theory, which
must always be considered with it, have tended to increase. 8
Recent years have witnessed necessary adjustments all along
the line. In consequence the executive and judicial departments
have come to have a larger share in tasks that are legislative in
character.9 The executive departments have expanded with
amazing rapidity. New agencies have been created and new pow-
ers granted to them. 10 The work of the courts has changed too.
New administrative functions have been added to their duties
and large rule-making powers granted to them as well." In
short, the shifting of functions in all directions has been so
great as to make it almost impossible to establish a clear bound-
ary line separating the several departments of government.
12
6See John A. Fairlie, "The Separation of Powers," Michigan Law
Review (1923), Vol. 21, p. 393 if; A. N. Holcombe, State Government
in the United States, (3d ed.) 1928, pp. 49-61.
1W. F. Willoughby, Introduction to the Study of Government of
Modern States, 1924, pp. 227-267.
8Such "exceptions" however, have been present from a very early
date. See Walter F. Dodd, State Government, 1928, pp. 64-65; A. N.
Holcombe, State Government in the United States, (3d ed.), 1928, ch. 4.
"In recent years we have sometimes seemed in danger of regarding
administrative adjudication as a much more modern growth than it
really is.***instances of administrative adjudication began to increase
In the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century and
met with no unfavorable reception at the hands of the courts; see
Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 312 (1805); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How.
236 (1845); Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. (1856). Hostility began to appear
after the middle of the century with the strong resurgence of the doc-
trine of vested rights. See below, ch. 3, note 20, p. 44." John Dick-
Inson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of the Law, pp. 5-6.
'See Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1929), pp. 215-218; U. G.
Duback, "Quasi-Legislative Powers of State Boards of Health," Amer.
Pol. Sci. Rev. (1916), Vol. 10, p. 80; Ray Brown, "An Executive De-
partment's Exercise of Quasi-Judicial and Quasi-Legislative Powers in
Wisconsin," Wisconsin Law Review (1926), pp. 385, 489.
"Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1929), p. 81.
"
1 Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1929), pp. 70, 71, 216-218.
12"We may as well recognize that sometimes the insurance com-
missioner is an official clerk, sometimes he is a judge, sometimes he
Is a law-giver, and sometimes he is both prosecuting attorney and
hangman. He Is partly executive, partly judicial, and partly legisla-
tive; and yet he is not confined within any of these categories. I defy
anyone to tell me when he stops legislating and begins to judge, or
when he stops judging and begins to execute." Edwin W. Patterson,
The Insurance Commissioner in the United States, p. 5.
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As new conditions have arisen the lines separating one depart-
ment from another have changed again and again.'3
The most important result of these adjustments, from our
point of view,14 is the fact that the whole problem of the rela-
tionship between administrative and judicial branches has un-
dergone a substantial change, and will probably undergo even
greater cbianges as time goes on, all of which raises questions as
to the ultimate effect of this movement on the fundamental prin-
ciples of our system.15 The immediate effect of the movement
was to remove whole classes of cases from the courts and turn
them over to administrative authorities, 16 or to administrative
tribunals of a quasi-judicial capacity.17
13 See Frederick Green, "Separation of Governmental Powers,"
Yale Law Journal (1920), Vol. 29, p. 369. Roscoe Pound in an article
in the Columbia Law Review gives a list ot instances where powers
formerly classed as "judicial" are no longer treated as such when en-
trusted to administrative agencies. See "Justice According to Law,"
Columbia Law Review (1907), Vol. 14, p. 15 ff.
1 4"If one were compelled to state the most important experiment
in the administration of justice made in the twentieth century, the
answer would unhesitantly be the attempt to secure justice through
administrative courts. Such tribunals have sprung up with amazing
rapidity, they have taken over an enormous amount of litigation, for-
merly handled by the courts, and the law concerning administrative
justice is the most rapidly growing branch of law in our entire juris.
prudence." R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor (1919), p. 83.
15"The multiplication in recent years of bodies like public service
commissions and industrial accident boards, accompanies by the vest-
ing of ampler powers in health officers, building inspectors, and the
like, has raised anew for our law, after three centuries, the problem
of executive justice. That government officials should assume the tra-
ditional function of courts of law, and be permitted to determine the
rights of individuals, is a development so out of line with the supposed
path of our legal growth as to challenge to certain underlying prin-
ciples of our jurisprudence. (See Hon. Geo. Sutherland, President's
Address, American Bar Association, Reports American Bar Association
(1917), xlii, 204 ff.; Hon. Wm. D. Guthrie, President's Address, New
York State Bar Association, Reports N. Y. State Bar Association
(1923), xlvi, 175 ff.) 'What is the meaning and occasion of the pres-
ent development? What is its bearing on the doctrine of the "su-
premacy of the law" which has been so long considered as central to
our legal tradition? What can be said of the present validity of that
doctrine? And what considerations are proper to be applied in delim-
iting a boundary-line between the respective provinces of administra-
tive agencies and courts." John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and
the Supremacy of the Law in the United States (1927), p. 3.
'6 See Ernest Freund et al., Growth of American Administrative
Law (1930); Warren H. Pillsbury, "Administrative Tribunals," Har-
yard Law Rev. Vol. 36, pp. 405, 483; Ray A. Brown, "The Functions of
Courts and Commissions," Har. Law. Rev., Vol. 38, p. 447; Dicey, "lDe-
velopment of Administrative Law in England," Law Quarterly Rev.,
Vol. 31, p. 138; Harold J. Laski, "The Growth of Administrative Dis-
cretion," Journ. of Pub. Adm., Vol. I, p. 92; Sir Josiah Stump, "Devo-
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The courts have never been effectively organized to dispose
of many complex issues coming before them. They were re-
quired to shoulder such burdens despite their lack of facilities
for handling them. Inadequate treatment necessarily resulted.
This state of affairs was made more difficult by the Anglo-
Saxon emphasis on the doctrine of individual rights and firm
belief that such rights could only be adequately protected by the
courts.' 8 In the past the American people had bestowed on ad-
lution of Legislative Function," Journ. of Public Adm., Vol. 2, p. 23;
Sir Lynden Macassey, "Law-making by Governmental Departments,"
Journ. of Soc. Comp. Leg. (3rd ser.), Vol. 2, p. 73; Bowman, "Ameri-
can Administrative Tribunals," Pot. Sci. Quarterly, Vol. 21, pp. 607 ff.;
Powell, "Conclusiveness of Administrative Declarations in the Federal
Government," Amer. Pot. Sci. Rev., Vol. 1, p. 583 ff.; Beale, "Expansion
of American Administrative Law," Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 30, (1916-
1917), p. 430 ff.; Ashley, Local and Central Government, pp. 306 ff.;
Redlich and Hurst, Local Government in England, Vol. 2, p. 365; Parker,
"Administiative Courts for the United States," Proc. Amer. Pol. Sci.
Assn., Vol. 6 (1900), p. 46; Roscoe Pound, "The Growth of Adminis-
trative Justice," Wisc. Law Rev. Vol. 2, p. 321 (1924).
11 "The introduction of administrative justice," says John Dickin-
son, "has encountered In our constitutional doctrine of the 'separation
of powers' a barrier which has been ended only by the invention of
glaring legal fifictions embodied in such words as 'quasi-legislative,'
'quasi-judicial,' and the like." Administrative Justice and the Su-
premacy of the Law (1926), p. 32.
, The Anglo-Saxon doctrine places equally great emphasis on the
independence of the courts. All legal controversies, according to this
doctrine, should be decided by the ordinary judicial courts which
should be supreme in such matters. Any notion of administrative
jurisdiction such as is known and practiced on the Continent of Eu-
rope would be inconsistent with this theory. There is in Anglo-Saxon
legal theory one law and one court for the citizen and public function-
ary alike. A right to sue the state is not admitted except where it is
expressly conferred by statute, and when it is conferred it is usually
subject to restrictions which frequently make the action difficult. (See
A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, (2nd ed.) lecture 5; and his
article, "The Droit Administratif in Modern French Law," Law Quar-
terly Review, Vol. 17 (1901), pp. 302 ff.) The system of administra-
tive law and jurisdiction found in European countries has been criti-
cized by commentators trained in Anglo-Saxon legal theory, as a sys-
tem which is fundamentally wrong because it is based on the prin-
ciple of inequality between the official class and the body of private
citizens. (See A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Eu-
rope, Vol. 1, p. 58; compare with later view in Government of Eng-
land, Vol. 2, p. 503.) This criticism is not convincing to some ob-
servers. (See defense of the administrative law by Professor J. H.
Morgan In his introduction to Robinson's Public Authorities and Legal
Liability (1925), pp. 61 ff. Professor Morgan contends that the indi-
vidual in France and Germany is better protected against arbitrary
and Illegal conduct of the government than he is in England. Note
similar defense in Munro, Governments o1 Europe, pp. 534-47. Com-
pare also Marriot, The Mechanism of the Modern State (1927), Vol. 2,
pp. 273 ff.; Allen, "Bureaucracy Triumphant," Quarterly Review, Vol.
240 (1923), p. 247; and Barker, "The Rule of Law," Political Science
Quarterly, May 1914, pp. 117 ff.
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ministrative officers a pitifully meagre grant of power to enforce
compliance with provisions of law through their own action.'x
'Where the coercion of the individual was necessary in enforcing
legal provisions, the administrative officers concerned had to
resort to the courts to definitely determine and apply the neces-
sary measures. At one time this position was a sound one.
Today serious consideration must be given to the problem of
organizing effective machinery to relieve the courts from the
burden of acting as agencies for the application of public law
to specific cases.20 An administrative body can act less technic-
ally and oftentimes more promptly in such matters.21
19 "Our government was one of laws and not of men. Administra-
tion had become "only a very subordinate agency in the whole process
of government." Complete elimination of the personal in all matters
of affecting the life, liberty, property or fortune of the citizens seemed
to have been attained. What. in other lands was committed to admin-
istration and inspection and executive supervision, we left to the
courts. We were adverse to inspection and supervision in advance of
action, preferring to show the individual his duty by a general law,
to leave -him free to act according to his judgment, and to prosecute
him and impose the predetermined penalty in case his free action
infringed the law. It was fundamental in our policy to confine admin-
istration to the inevitable minimum. In other words, where some
peoples went to one extreme and were bureau-ridden, we went to the
other extreme and were law-ridden.***Obviously it threw a great bur-
den upon the judicial system, and despite the reaction which had taken
place, will continue to put a strain upon the courts for a long time to
come.***Nothing is so characteristic of the American public law of the
last -half of the nineteenth century as the completeness with which
executive action is tied down by legal liability and judicial review."
Roscoe Pound, "Organization of the Courts," Journ. Amer. Jud. Soc.
(1927), pp. 69-70.
2"There is one special field of law development," says Elihu Root,
"which has manifestly become inevitable. We are entering upon the
creation of a body of administrative law quite different in its ma-
chinery, its remedies, and its necessary safeguards from the old meth-
ods of regulation by specific statutes by the courts. As any com-
munity passes from simple to complex conditions the only way in
which the government can deal with the increased burden thrown
upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised in detail by sub-
ordinate agents, subject to the control of general directions prescribed
by superior authority. The necessities of our situation have already led
to an extensive employment of that method. The Interstate Commerce
Commission, the state public service commissions, the Federal Trade
Commissions, the powers of the Federal Reserve Board, the health de-
partments of the states, and many other supervisory offices and agencies
are familiar illustrations. Before these agencies the old doctrine pro-
hibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from
the field and given up the fight. There will be no withdrawal from
these experiments. We shall go on; we shall expand them, whether
we approve theoretically or not, because such agencies furnish pro-
tection to rights and obstacles to wrong doing which under our new
social and industrial conditions cannot be practically accomplished
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The interpretation and application of modern social and eco-
nomic legislation has raised difficult problems for the courts. Spe-
cial technical knowledge and skill is required in regulating the
rates and conditions of public utilities, involving as it frequently
does, intricate questions of valuation and business organization.
Specialized knowledge is equally necessary in dealing with prob-
lems arising under laws regulating workmen's compensation;
public health; the construction and operation of factories, shops,
and mills; the production and sale of foods and so on.22 We
expect too much when we require judges to be expertly trained
in the principles of the law and equally familiar with the com-
plex problems of public administration.
Such functions can perhaps be best performed by adminis-
trative bodies. 23 The wide adoption of administrative bodies
by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the
last generation." Report American Bar Association, 1916, pp. 368-369.
11W. F. Willoughby, in discussing this point, says: "The point
might be made that action along this line does not lessen the amount
of work to be done, but merely transfers responsibility from one
branch of the government to another. In one sense this is true. The
gain, however, can be none the less great. A court is at the best an
expensive institution. Its methods of procedure are formal and tech-
nical. It can only handle matters brought before it. It does not act
upon its own initiative. In the determining of facts it has no tech-
nically trained staff of its own. The proceeding is in the nature of
a duel between the parties, and almost its only method of determining
facts is by the cumbersome and expensive question-and-answer device.
More fundamental still the burden of inquiry is in large part thrown
upon private individuals. In marked contrast with this, administra-
tive agencies can act on their own initiative, assume responsibility for
determining facts, and have expert staffs to do the work of investi-
gating. They are not bound by formal rules of evidence and pro-
cedure as are the courts, and they generally can and do, act in a more
direct, efficient, and economical manner and with much greater dis-
patch," Principles of Judicial Administration (1929), pp. 20-21.
" For a detailed consideration of the administrative determination
of tax obligations; the administrative enforcement of license and per-
mit systems; proper trade practices; workmen's compensation; public
utility laws; payment of wages due; small loan laws, etc. See W. F.
Willoughby, (ibid), ch. 3.
" "In considering this problem, two problems must be kept in
mind: the distinction between the function of courts in determining
facts and that of determining the law applicable to such facts; and the
distinction between the function of courts as agencies for handling
matters to be adjudicated in the first instance and their function of
acting as agencies of review to which appeal may be made to correct
improper action on the part of administrative officers. This right of
review may embrace the right to review matters of both fact and law
or be confined to matters of law only. If these distinctions are kept in
mind, it is possible greatly to relieve the courts as fact-finding agen-
cies, and by confining their function to review, to throw a large part
of the work of determining facts now being informed by the courts
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within recent years lends support to this statement.2 4 Virtually
a new body of law has been developed with respect to the
method and determination of these bodies. 25 This development
in no way interferes with or decreases legitimate judicial func-
tions. In fact it relieves the excessive strain which the changing
conditions of modern society imposes upon the courts. 20 Fur-
upon administrative officers or quasi-judicial administrative tribunals."
W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929), p. 20.
24See R. H. Smth, Justice and the Poor, pp. 83-93.
"The development of a distinctive law is in process. Adminis-
trative law has ceased to be descriptive of an exotic.***Its growth Is
particularly luxuriant in the federal domain, exercised through a for-
midable range and variety of federal administrative tribunals." Frank-
furter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1929), pp. 184-
186. "Within a few years," says Charles E. Hughes, "plans of regula-
tion involving new exertions of Federal power have followed each
other in swift succession, reflecting convictions of recent origin with
respect to national needs. The Interstate Commdrce Act, the Anti-
Trust Act, the Safety Appliance Act, the Hepburn Amendment and the
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Food and
Drugs Act, the Meat Inspection Act, the Hours of Service Act, the
Employers Liability Act, the Clayton Act and the Trade Commission
Act, have to a considerable extent recast our law.***With this note-
worthy change in point of view, there have been constant manifesta-
tions of a deepening conviction of the impotency of Legislature with
respect to some of the most important departments of law-making.
Complaints must be heard, expert investigations conducted, complex
situations deliberately and impartially analyzed and legislative rules
intelligently adapted to a myriad of instances falling within a general
class. It was not difficult to frame legislation establishing a general
standard, but to translate an accepted principle into regulations wisely
adapted to particular cases required an experienced body sitting con-
tinuously and removed so far as possible from the blandishments and
intrigues of politics.' This administrative type is not essentially new
in itself, but the extension of its use in a State and Nation constitutes
a new departure." 39 N. Y. St. Bar Assn. Rep. 266, 268-270 (1916).
* "The possibilities of this method of administering justice are
best indicated by the work of the public service commissions and In-
dustral accident commissions. They have simplified procedure, re-
duced costs, made lawyers less indispensable, accelerated the despatch
of business, increased the employment of technical experts in the ad-judication of cases, and made justice more certain. The success of
the administrative tribunals has had good results both upon the legis-
latures and the courts. It has enabled the legislatures to rid them-
selves of much detail in the development of modern social policy;
which they were unfitted to handle. This was tended to improve the
quality of the work which has remained for the legislatures. It has
also enabled the courts to concentrate more effectively upon the tasks
for which they are best fitted. More and more they tend to emphasize
the importance of the strictly procedural limitations upon the powers
of administrative tribunals, while leaving them free to exercise their
discretion within the bounds prescribed by the rule of "reason." The
test of "reasonableness" is as difficult to apply in reviewing the acts of
administrative tribunals as in reviewing those of legislatures, but the
disposition to tolerate differences of policy seems no less developed In
one field than in the other." Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government
RELATIONSHIP OF EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 253
ther additions to the machinery of preliminary investigation of
complex issues may be expected, if satisfactory results continue
to be secured from administrative bodies. 27 In all of these mat-
ters it is probable that some judicial review will be necessary. 28
Suggestions have already been made that the plan of com-
pensation worked out in connection with workmen's compensa-
tion laws should be applied to railroad 29 and automobile acei-
dents.30 If this were done another great group of cases would
in the United States (1928), p. 467; R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor,
chs. 12-13.
21"Ninety per cent of all accident cases which come before the
Industrial accident board are settled automatically, promptly, and with-
out expense. This is something which our courts have never been able
to do. The honor of making such a plan operate successfully must be
awarded to an administrative, and not to a judicial tribunal. This
makes a tremendous advance towards freedom and equality of justice.
Today, nine men out of ten get their fair compensation at once, with-
out cost and without the expense of employing counsel. Formerly they
were obliged to take what the insurance company adjuster offered or
else obtain a lawyer on a contingent fee and wage a long and dreary
fight. The new administrative method is so far superior to the old tort
system that I hope to see it extended to interstate commerce employees,
and to passengers on railroads and street railways." R. H. Smith,
"Denial of Justice," Journ. Amer. Jud. Soc., Vol. 3, p. 122, December,
1919. In this connectfon see H. D. Laube, "Administrative Problems
In Wisconsin's Workmen's Compensation," Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 3, p. 65, 1925.
",Walter F. Dodd in discussing this point said: "It is important
that proper methods be established for the judicial review of decisions
of such bodies. Administrative tribunals may perhaps be most effec-
tively organized as subordinate agencies in the judicial organization
if the courts come to be organized in such a way to do their work
effectively. In rate making today, one of the chief difficulties is that
administrative bodies and courts act in substantially complete inde-
pendence of each other. The utilities commission investigates and
fixes rates; the court, by Independent methods, reaches a different con-
clusion and annuls the action of the commission. See McCardle v. In-
dianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926). For this reason efforts
have been made in Virginia and Oklahoma to make the highest state
court an agency in rate-making, rather than a mere reversing body.
(See pp. 68, 91). But no steps have yet been taken to work out satis-
factory relations between the state rate-fixing agencies and the federal
courts." State Government (1929), p. 341.
0W. H. Taft, "Administration of Justice," Central Law Journal,
Vol. 72, pp. 191, 197; Moorfield Story, Reform of Legal Procedure,
p. 72; Arthur A. Ballantine, "Modernizing Railway Accident Law,"
The Outlook, Nov. 15, 1916; Arthur A. Ballantine, "A Compensation for
Railway Accident Claims," Harv. Law Rev. Vol. 14, p. 705 (1916);
Special Message of Governor Alfred E. Smith to the New York State
Legislature in 1928.
Robert S. Marx, "The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit and a
Remedy," Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., Vol. 10, July 1924; "Compulsory
Automobile Insurance," Ohio Law Bulletin and Reporter, Vol. 23, July
27, 1925; "Compulsory Automobile Insurance," National Mun. Rev.,
Vol. 16, Aug. 1927; Report of the New Jersey Commission on Compul-
sory Automobile Insurance, 1926; J. P. Chamberlain, "Compulsory In-
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be taken out of the traditional sphere of the courts,3 ' and placed
under administrative commissions.3" This plan has received
the support of some very respectable authorities. When one
considers the burdens imposed upon the courts as a Sresult of
automobile accidents alone, the importance of such a plan
becomes apparent.33
Robert S. Marx, formerly Judge of the Superior Court of
Cincinnati, is strongly in favor of the establishment of a system
of administrative tribunals to handle personal injury suits re-
sulting from automobile accidents. He is in favor of a state
compensation fund to which owners of all vehicles, especially
automobiles, should be required to contribute. Persons injured
or killed in traffic would be entitled to compensation from this
fund which would be administered in a similar manner to the
workmen's compensation laws.3 4 Judge Marx is of the opinion
surance of Automobiles," Amer. Bar Assn. Journ., Vol. 12, p. 49, 1926;
Edward C. Stone, "Some Views on Compulsory Automobile Insurance,"
Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., Vol. 13, p. 151, 1927.
' According to the report of the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law,
52% of all the cases now awaiting trial in the different states, cover-
ing their period of study, fall in the category of what we call negli-
gence cases.
"The factor of fault would be largely eliminated under such a
scheme and compulsory compensation provided in such cases in the
same manner as in industrial accident cases.
3 "Three-fourths of all civil jury trials are concerned with per-
sonal claims largely arising from automobile accidents. The major
portion of the time of all civil courts in the trial divisions is consumed
in the trial and dispostion of these cases which also take the time
of appellate courts to a greater extent than we realize.***
"All of you know from personal experience of the futility of these
personal injury suits as a means of doing justice.***For practical pur-
poses the personal injury suit in automobile accident cases is fre-
quently entirely worthless and at best is slow, uncertain, wasteful,
and unsatisfactory. It is a survival under modern conditions of a
legal system which gias out-lived its usefulness and its retention is
working irreparable injury." Robert S. Marx, "Compulsory Automo-
bile Insurance," Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., 1925.
A study of the causes of the congested calendar of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York indicated that actions for
personal injuries resulting from automobile accidents represented 75%
of all the business of the supreme court in the County of New York
during 1926 and 73% of the total litigation before the court in 1927,
while additional cases were handled in the city court and the munici-
pal court. See First and Second Reports of the Special Calendar Com-
mittee Appointed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme court,
First Division. New York, 1927-28. See also Arthur A. Ballantine,
"Compensation for Automobile Accidents," Am. Bar Assn. Journ. Vol.
18, April 1932, pp. 221-228, 282.
3'Judge Marx observes that when the first workmen's laws were
passed they were bitterly opposed by lawyers, employers, and insur-
ance companies. Although dire consequences were predicted if such a
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that every argument in favor of workmen's compensation acts
is applicable to traffic accidents.3 5 Since it has been demon-
strated that but a small proportion of automobile owners carry
liability insurance and that many of those responsible for ac-
cidents are judgment proof, such arguments may very well have
more force in their application to traffic accidents.
The final results of the readjustments which have been
made in the relationship existing between the administrative
and judicial branches remains a matter of some doubt.3 6 It
would seem, however, that the system of administrative adjudi-
cation is here to stay.37 Some changes in form and practice
system were adopted, it is now in force in forty-two states and working
with success. Judge Marx is of the opinion that we would meet up
with a similar experience in connection with compulsory compensa-
tion for traffic accidents.
1"I have come to the conclusion," he says, "as a result of nearly
ten years more or less active experience in the trial of personal injury
suits and four and a half years' observation of the same as a trial
judge; and that experience has convinced me of the utter futility of the
personal injury suit as a remedy for people who are hurt or killed in
the legitimate use of the streets.***I have no hesitancy in indicting
the whole legal theory of liability based upon fault as a remedy for
people who are hurt or killed, indicting it upon the grounds that it
is hazardous, that it is unjust and uncertain. More than that, it is
worse than the old employer's liability, because at least, under the
employer's liability suit the employer was a known defendant; he was
usually a solvent defendant; the witnesses were available and were
often friendly workmen." "The Curse of the Personal Damage Suit
and a Remedy," Amer. Bar. Assn. Journ., July, 1924.
" "The future development of this type of administrative tribunal
perplexes all jurists. It is undoubtedly true that some of its present
advantages are due to the fact that it occupies an extra-legal position.
(Pound: "Organization of Courts," American Judicature Society, BUl-
letin 6, page 4) and that temporarily it escapes from the limitations
of justice according to law and judicial justice. It is closely anala-
gous to the rise of equity (ibid, p. 5) with the exception that instead
of entrusting justice to priests in place of judges, our recourse has
been to laymen. New agencies enjoy a sort of hiatus when rules and
precedents are few, when the liberalizing spirit is strong, but this is
transitory. (Pound, Jus-tice According to Law, p. II). It is certain
that the administrative tribunals must ascertain and administer their
justice according to law, and it is likely that they will ultimately be-
come part of the regular judicial system. "(Ibid. p. 42; Report of Dean
Pound to the President of Harvard University for 1915-16, p. 2)." R.
H. Smith, Justice and the Poor, p. 91.
"'In any merger, and in developments in that direction, there is
nothing to compel a giving up of the use by administrative tribunals
of Investigators, impartial physicians, simple procedure, simple forms,
mail service, and the automatic settlement of claims. If they interfere
with parts of the traditional machinery, such parts ought to be
scrapped. Administrative tribunals have much to teach judicial trib-
unals about promptness, inexpensiveness, and limiting the attorney
to clearly defined functions." R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor, p. 91.
K. L.-7
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may be expected as we gather more experience in this field 38
Indeed some observers are of the opinion that eventually it will
be necessary to create a system of special courts similar in char-
acter to the French administrative courts.3 9
This system of courts was established in France at the time
of the Revolution.40 At first the determination of administra-
tive controversies was left to the administration itself, but in
time a series of special administrative tribunals or councils were
created to exercise this function.4 1 From the beginning the
"Roscoe Pound, "Organization of the Courts, Amer. Jud. Soc. Bull.
6, p. 4; "Justice According to Law" Columbia Law Rev. (1907), Vol.
13, p. 696; Report of Dean Pound to the President of Harvard Univer-
sity for 1915-1916.
William D. Guthrie, "Presidential Address before the New York
State Bar Assoc.," N. Y. St. Bar Assn. Report 169; Guthrie, League of
Nations and Miscellaneous Addresses, 352. "The need for a coherent
system of administrative law, for uniformity and despatch in adjudi-
cation, for the subtle skill required in judges called upon to synthesize
the public and private claims peculiarly involved in administrative
litigation, these and kindred considerations will have to be balanced
against the traditional hold of a single system of courts, giving a gen-
eralized professional aptitude to its judges and bringing to the review
of administrative conduct a technique and a temperament trained in
litigation between private individuals." Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court, 1927, p. 186.
It was provided by an Act of August 16, 1790, that the judicial
and administrative functions should be kept separate and distinct and
that the role of the judicial courts should be kept restricted to the de-
cision of cases arising under the civil and criminal law. "Joseph
Barthelmy, in his Gouvernement de la France (Paris, 1919), argues
that the system of administrative law was largely a spontaneous re-
sult of the French Revolution. The revolutionary authorities, he says
had to make attacks upon property and persons; the judges of the
regular courts tried to protect the citizen; whereupon the government
fulminated its prohibitions against them. They were forbidden to in-
terfere with administrative acts. 'Thus originated,' he says, 'the
unfortunate principle of separating the administrative from the judi-
cial authorities.' But the beginning of the separation far antedates
the great upheaval of 1789. As President Lowell showed many years
ago, it was a logical outcome of two features which characterized the
old regime in France, namely, the weakness of the courts and the
overpowering strength of a centralized administration. If France had
possessed a system of common law, as in England, with regular courts
strongly entrenched, it is not probable that the present situation would
have arisen." W. B. Munro, The Governments of Europe, p. 536.
4The principal administrative courts in France are the interde-
partmental councils of the prefecture and the Council of State. There
are twenty-two departmental councils of the prefecture, each serving
from two to seven departments. In addition, the Department of the
Seine has a council of its own. Each interdepartmental council con-
sists of a president and four councillors. These councils hear com-
plaints made by individuals against the actions of subordinate offi-
cials. They deal with controversies concerning tax assessments and
most of the matters which come before them are of this nature. They
also have jurisdiction over questions relating to public works (espe-
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work of these courts has been received favorably by the French
people.42 Indeed the role of guardian of private rights which
once belonged to the Court of Cassation (the supreme court of
France for all ordinary cases both civil and criminal) has
definitely passed to the Council of State, or, more accurately
to that branch of the Council of State which acts as a superior
administrative court. The Council of State, says a recent writer
"occupies a place in the public esteem and confidence of the
French which is even higher than that which the Supreme Court
enjoys among the American people.' 43
A number of European countries have taken up the idea
with apparent success. Included in this number are Germany,44
cially highways) and the conduct of local elections. Procedure in
these courts Is simple and economical. Parallel with the interdepart-
mental councils of the prefecture are various special administrative
courts, notably the educational councils and councils of revision. Ap-
peals from these lower administrative courts are taken to the Council
of State. This is a large body, made up of two elements, political and
non-political. Questions of administrative law are heard and determ-
ined by a section of the Council which consists of thirty-five non-
political members, or conseillers en service ordinaire, as they are
called. This group includes many distinguished jurists. Every year
several thousands of cases are decided by this tribunal at a minimum
expenditure of time and money for the litigant. It has been success-
ful and enjoys the respect of the French people. W. B. Munro, Gov-
erniments of Europe (1931), pp. 543-544.
"James W. Garner says: "It can now be said without possibility
of contradiction that there is no country in which the rights of private
individuals are so well protected against the arbitrariness, the abuses,
and the illegal conduct of the administrative authorities, and where
the people are so sure of receiving reparation for injuries sustained
on account of such conduct." "French Administrative Law," Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 32, p. 599, April, 1924.
43J. W. Garner, "French Administrative Law," Yale Law Journal
Vol. 32, p. 597, April, 1924; J. W. Garner, "Judicial Control of Admin-
istrative and Legislative Acts in France," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 9, pp. 657 ff.; Leon Duguit, "The French Administrative
Courts," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, p. 385 (1914); A. Law-
rence Lowell, The Government of England, Vol. 2, ch. 62; A. V. Dicey,
Law of the Constitution, (2nd ed. and 3rd ed.) Lect. 5; also his "The
Drolt Administratif in Modern French Law," Law Quarterly Review,
Vol. 17, p. 302 (1901); Bruce Wyman, Principles of Administrative
Law, 1903; F. A. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law (1903);
H. Sidgewick, Elements of Politics (1897), pp. 505-507; J. A. R. Mar-
riot, The Mechanism of the Modern State, Vol. 2, p. 266 (1927.)
'1 In many of the German states, administrative courts modelled on
the French system have existed since 1875. In Germany unlike France,
the judges are irremovable by the government. As a matter of prac-
tice, however, French administrative judges are not removed by the
government at pleasure. Since the establishment of the Third Repub-
lic no administrative judge has been so removed. Neither is there a
known instance In which the government exercised pressure upon them
to obtain a decision in its favor. The new German constitution (Art.
107) requires the establishment of administrative courts for the pro-
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Italy,45 Switzerland, 46 Finland,47 Poland,48 and Czecho-Slo-
vakia.49 In these countries, the administrative courts have a
separate and distinct organization.50 In their task of deciding
controversies which mainly involve claims against the state they
apply a body of law separate and distinct from the Civil Law.
It is too early to predict what influence the French system
of specialized courts will have on the final form of our constantly
developing system of administrative adjudication. Its effects
may be great or it may be small. Certainly it is safe to say that
it could not be adopted without opposition. The ancient pre-
tection of the individual against ordinances of the executive, both in
the Reich and in the states where they do not actually exist. For fur-
ther discussion of the German administrative court system see: W. B.
Munro, The Governments of Europe, 1931, pp. 638-639; Malbone W. Gra-
ham, New Governments of Central Europe (1924), pp. 64-66, 456; J. W.
Garner, "The German Judiciary," Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1903),
pp. 420 ff.
"In Italy a system of administrative courts and jurisdiction has
existed since 1890. See in this connection: W. B. Munro, The Gov-
ernments of Europe (1931), p. 679.
41 In Switzerland a federal administrative court was established
in 1914. "Switzerland," says W. B. Munro, "has a system of admin-
istrative law, but no system of administrative courts. When contro-
versies arise between the federal government and the citizen, involv-
ing questions of administrative law, the issues are not placed before
a court, but are determined in the first instance by the federal council,
that is, by the ministers. If the ruling of this body is challenged, an
appeal may be taken (as has been said) to the legislative chambers
sitting in joint session; but this is a slow and clumsy arrangement.
It has long been regarded as unsatisfactory and a radical change has
been under discussion for many years. No constitutional obstacle now
stands in the way, for the constitution has been amended in such a
way as to give the federal parliament a free hand in the matter. But
the latter, although committed to the principle of establishing a fed-
eral administrative court, has not yet been able to ipake up Its mind
as to how the court should be organized or what jurisdiction it ought
to be given. Thus the matter has hung fire without any definite action.
Controversies on matters of administration are not so numerous in
Swiss federal government, however, because the great majority of ad-
ministrative officers are agents of the cantons." The Government of
Europe, p. 713, 714.
41 The constitution of Finland (Art. 57) provides for the establish-
ment of a supreme administrative court.
4 The constitution of Poland (Art. 86) provides for the creation
by statute of a court of special competence (tribunal of conflicts) to
decide conflicts of jurisdiction between the administrative authorities
and the courts.
48The constitution of Czecho-Slovakia (Art. 96) declares that the
judicial power shall be separated from the administrative power, but
it does not specifically require the establishment of administrative
courts.
5* In Belgium there are no administrative courts and the remedy
of an injured individual is similar to that in England and the United
States. See Thomas Reed, Government and Politics of Belgium, p. 111.
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judice of the Anglo-Saxon lawyer to the Continental system will
not be easily overcome. One thing is evident, however, and that
is, that our new forms of legal control through law administer-
ing agencies must be adjusted sooner or later to our traditional
system of judicial justice.
